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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Wayne D. Anderson, II, appeals from the district court's order denying his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He also appeals from the sentence imposed
upon his guilty plea to lewd conduct with a minor under 16 years of age.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
A member of Anderson's family reported to Nampa police that Anderson
was sexually abusing his daughter.

(PSI, p.2.)

Police contacted Anderson's

wife, who reported that two of their daughters told her of sexual abuse
perpetrated on them by Anderson. (ld.) Police interviewed both daughters. (Id.)
Seventeen-year-old D.A. told police that her father had been touching her
inappropriately for several months.

(PSI, p.2.)

D.A. reported that Anderson

would touch her breasts, at first on top of her clothes, but then under her shirt
and bra. (ld.) Later, he began putting his hand on her crotch over her clothes.
(Id.) The abuse eventually progressed to manual-to-genital contact under D.A.'s
clothes. (Id.) D.A. began kicking Anderson or moving away anytime Anderson
sat down next to her. (PSI attachment, pA8.) Anderson told D.A. that if she ever
told her church bishop about the abuse, that both he and D.A.'s mother would go
to jail. (Id.)
Thirteen-year-old C.A. told police that Anderson put his hand down her
pants and underwear while she was sleeping. (PSI, p.2.) Anderson left when
C.A. told him to go away, but he returned to her bedroom on another occasion,
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rubbed her leg, and said, "Can't we just playa bit?"

(PSI attachment, p.45.)

C.A. kicked Anderson, who eventually left. (Id.)
Officers then interviewed Anderson. (PSI, pp.2-3; PSI attachment, pp.5152.)

Anderson confessed to touching D.A. multiple times on her breasts and

vagina, and to penetrating D.A.'s vagina with his finger on one occasion whiie
D.A. was sleeping. (PSI attachment, p.51.) Anderson also stated that he had
been "grooming" D.A. for some time, and that the abuse started when she was
13 or 14 years old. (PSI, p.3; PSI attachment, pp.51-52.)
The state charged Anderson with lewd contact with a minor under 16, sex
abuse of a child under 18, and a sentencing enhancement for being a repeat
sexual offender pursuant to I.C. § 19-2520G.

(R., pp.6-9.)

While he was in

custody awaiting trial, Anderson wrote a letter asking his wife to prevent their
daughters from testifying. (PSI attachment, pp.115-116, 118.) Shortly before the
scheduled trial date, Anderson and the state reached a plea agreement.
pp.76-82.)

(R.,

Anderson entered an Alford plea to lewd conduct and the repeat

sexual offender sentencing enhancement, and the state agreed to recommend a
fixed sentence of no more than the mandatory minimum 15 years. (R., pp.76-82;

2/14/12 Tr., p.6, L.17 - p.24, L.24.) The state also agreed to dismiss the sex
abuse charge, and to not file an additional charge of intimidation of a witness for
the letter Anderson sent to his wife from jail. (R., p.78; 2/14/12 Tr., p.6, L.17 p.9, L.12.)
Prior to sentencing, Anderson filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
(R., pp.83-85, 90-94.) Anderson asserted that his plea was involuntary because
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it was coerced by his wife, and because he was "completely devastated mentally

and emotionally." (R., pp.83-85, 90-94; 4/9/12 Tr., p.6, L.7 - p.10, L.12; 4/16/12
Tr., p.2, L.7 - p.5, L.13.) After two hearings, the district court denied Anderson's
motion

to

withdraw

his

guilty

plea,

and

his

subsequent

motion

for

reconsideration. (R., pp.97-101, 105-107; 7/16/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.1-16.)
The district court imposed a unified 40-year sentence with 15 years fixed.
(R., pp.117-118.) Anderson timely appealed. (R., pp.119-122.)
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ISSUES

Anderson states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it did not
permit Mr. Anderson to withdraw his guilty plea?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a
unified sentence of forty years, with fifteen years fixed, upon
Mr. Anderson following his plea of guilty to lewd conduct?

(Appellant's brief, p.9)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Anderson failed to show the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

2.

Has Anderson failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
imposed a unified 40-year sentence with 15 years fixed for lewd conduct?
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ARGUMENT
I.

Anderson Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Denying His Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea

A.

Introduction
Anderson contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his

pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-17.)
Specifically, Anderson contends that the district court erred because his wife's
coercion and his depression rendered his guilty plea constitutionally involuntary,
or constituted just cause for the withdrawal of his plea.

(Id.) A review of the

record and the applicable law supports the district court's determination that
Anderson failed to carry his burden of establishing either that his plea was
involuntary, or that there existed any other just reason entitling him to withdraw
his plea. Anderson has thus failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished
from arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d
775,780-781 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358,362,941
P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App. 1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's
factual findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. State v.
Holland, 135 Idaho 159,15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254,
869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994).
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C.

The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Denving Anderson's
Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be made before sentence is

imposed.

LC.R. 33(c). The presentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an

automatic right, however. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281,
284 (1990); Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535,211 P.3d at 780. The defendant bears
the burden of proving, in the district court, that the plea should be withdrawn.

kL.;

Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371,374-75,825 P.2d 94, 97-98 (Ct. App. 1992).
In ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the district court must
determine, as a threshold matter, whether the plea was entered knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily. State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109,
111 (1991); Hansiovan, 121 Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781; State v. Rodriguez,
118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990).

If the plea was

voluntary, in the constitutional sense, then the court must determine whether
other reasons exist to allow the defendant to withdraw the plea. Hansiovan, 121
Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781.

The decision to grant or deny a motion to

withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court.
P.3d at 780.

kL.

at 535, 211

"[T]he good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant's

assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the trial
court to decide."

kL.,

147 Idaho at 537,211 P.3d at 782.

In this case, the district court correctly rejected Anderson's contention that
family pressure and depression rendered

his guilty plea constitutionally

involuntary. (R., pp.97-101.) It also properly utilized its discretion in determining
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that these factors did not otherwise constitute just cause for the withdrawal of his
plea. (Id.)
It is well-established that family pressure not attributed to the state does
not render a confession constitutionally involuntary.

Hanslovan, 121 Idaho at

537-538,211 P.3d at 782-783 ("anxiety and pressure from the defendant's family
situation do not constitute impermissible coercion") (citing State v. Spry, 127
Idaho 107, 111, 897 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho
926, 928, 894 P.2d 159, 161 (Ct. App. 1995»). In State v. Nath, 141 Idaho 584,
586, 114 P.3d 142, 144 (Ct. App. 2005), the defendant argued that his guilty plea
was constitutionally involuntary because pleading guilty was the only option that
would allow him to be released to take care of his wife and mother, who were
both unable to care for themselves.

The Idaho Court of Appeals rejected his

argument, concluding that "[b]ecause Nath's personal family circumstances were
not attributable to the State, they likewise do not render his plea invalid or
coerced."

19.:

at 586, 114 P.3d at 144 (citing Politte v. United States, 852 F.2d

924, 930 (yth Cir. 1988)).
Further, Anderson's change of plea hearing contained a lengthy plea
colloquy designed to ensure the voluntariness of his plea. (2/14/12 Tr., p.9, L.9p.24, L.14.) The district court asked Anderson whether anyone had made any
threats against him, or utilized any coercion or inducements to cause him to
plead guilty, and Anderson responded in the negative. (2/14/12 Tr., p.16, LS.613.)

The court also advised Anderson that it was "highly unlikely" that it would

allow him to withdraw his guilty plea once he entered it, and Anderson stated he
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understood.

(2/14/12 Tr., p.23, Ls.22-2S.)

In his written guilty plea advisory

form, Anderson indicated there was no reason he would be unable to make
reasoned and informed decisions regarding this case. (R., p.78.)
Additionally, there is no indication in the record that any undiagnosed
"depression" asserted by Anderson rose to a level that rendered his guilty plea
constitutionally involuntary. While Anderson alleged that he was hospitalized in a
mental facility for three days following a suicide attempt shortly prior to his arrest
(4/9/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.9-16; PSI attachment, ppA-7), he has not demonstrated that
any mental health issue compromised the voluntariness of his guilty plea six
months later.

It is notable that despite this hospitalization and access to

healthcare professionals, Anderson was not diagnosed with a mental illness. In
fact, Anderson has never been diagnosed with a mental illness, and was not
prescribed any medication at the time of his guilty plea. (R., p.78.) Anderson did
not inform the district court of any mental or emotional issues during the change
of plea hearing, nor did he request that a competency or mental health evaluation
be conducted. (See 2/14/12 Tr.) While stress and undiagnosed "depression" no
doubt often accompany arrests for serious felonies, they do not automatically and
indefinitely render defendants incapable of entering valid guilty pleas.
Anderson has also failed to show that the district court abused its
discretion in determining that the above factors did not constitute other "just
cause" for the withdrawal of his plea.

Anderson did not allege that his wife

compelled his guilty plea through some sort of threat; he asserted only that his
wife expressed a strong desire that he plead guilty. (R., pp.83-8S, 90-94, 10S-

8

107.)

Where a defendant victimizes members of his own family, it is not

surprising that another family member would prefer that the case be resolved
prior to a trial at which child victims would have to testify. This was the primary
basis of Anderson's wife's expressed concern in this case. (See Joint Exhibit 1,
disc 1, 16:40 - 17:45, 19:00 - 20:00; disc 2, 4: 15 - 4:45.) A family member's
expression of her desire that a case be settled does not require a district court to
exercise its discretion in favor of granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
Finally, the written and recorded communications between Anderson and
his wife that are part of the record in this case do not reveal any overbearing
influence by Anderson's wife on Anderson's decision-making that would justify
the withdrawal of his plea.

Instead, the record demonstrates that it was

Anderson who attempted to coerce his wife to his own benefit.

While in pretrial

custody, Anderson wrote a letter asking his wife to "fight to conceal the truth from
[the state]." (PSI attachment, p.115.) Anderson asked his wife to tell his attorney
that his daughters were "determined to withdraw their testimony."

(ld.)

In a

recorded jailhouse conversation, Anderson accused his wife of not informing his
daughters of the consequences of testifying against him, and expressed his
belief that the state was engaged in a "scorched earth policy" that would
implicate both of them. (Joint exhibit 1, disc 1, 7:45 - 9:25, 11 :35 - 11 :45.) He
also cited her act of handing over his letters to the state as contributing to the
severity of the sentence he faced. (Joint exhibit 1, disc 1, 6:30 - 7:00, 18:2018:45.)
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The record supports the district court's determination that Anderson failed
to carry his burden of establishing either that his plea was involuntary or that
there existed any other just cause for withdrawal of the plea. Anderson has thus
failed to show an abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.

II.
Anderson Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
A.

Introduction
Anderson contends that the district court abused its discretion when it

imposed a 40-year unified sentence with 15 years fixed upon his guilty plea to
lewd conduct with a minor under 16, with a sentencing enhancement for being a
repeat sexual offender.

(Appellant's brief, pp.18-20.)

Anderson has failed to

establish an abuse of discretion considering the objectives of sentencing, the
nature of his crimes, and his status as a repeat sexual offender.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397,401 (2007).

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of sentencing discretion,

the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the
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sentence is excessive. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736,170 P.3d at 401. To establish
that the sentence is excessive, Anderson must demonstrate that reasonable
minds could not conclude the sentence is appropriate to accomplish the
sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.

kL

Idaho appellate courts presume that the fixed portion of a sentence will be

the defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888,
980 P.2d 552 (1999).
Pursuant to the I.C. § 19-2520G repeat sexual offender sentencing
enhancement, to which Anderson pled guilty (R., p.117), the district court was
required to impose a minimum fixed sentence of 15 years. State v. Ephraim, 152
Idaho 176, 178-179,267 P.3d 1291, 1293-1294 (Ct. App. 2011).

The district

court imposed this mandatory minimum 15-year fixed sentence.

(R., pp.117-

118.)

Because the district court had no authority to impose a lesser fixed

sentence, Anderson may only challenge the district court's 25-year indeterminate
sentence. A review of the record reveals that this indeterminate sentence was
appropriate.
Anderson's sexual victimization of his own daughters dates back to at
least 1996. In 1998, Anderson confessed to fondling the groin area of his oldest
daughter, E.A., and that this abuse started when E.A. was approximately 2 Yz
years old. (PSI attachment, pp.74, 78-86.) Anderson pled guilty to lewd conduct
and the district court imposed a unified eight-year sentence with three years
fixed.

(PSI attachment, pp.93-95.)

Anderson completed sexual offender
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treatment through SANE Solutions, and a "strict protection plan" was put in place
upon his return to his residence with his three daughters. (PSI, pp.3, 11.)
Despite his treatment and the implementation of a protection plan,
Anderson began sexually abusing D.A., his middle daughter, within two or three
years of satisfying his prior lewd conduct sentence.

(PSI attachment, p.51.)

Anderson subsequently abused his youngest daughter as well. (PSI attachment,
pp.45-46.) As discussed in Section I, Anderson has demonstrated a willingness
to utilize his wife to attempt to cover up his criminal behavior.

A lengthy

indeterminate prison sentence is more than appropriate to ensure some type of
meaningful community supervision over Anderson's relationships with children he
may father or have contact with in the future, if and when he is paroled.
The fact that Anderson believes that the district court should have
imposed a shorter indeterminate sentence does not establish an abuse of the
district court's discretion. Because Anderson has failed to establish the district
court abused its sentencing discretion, he is not entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Anderson's sentence
and the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
DATED this 17th day of July, 2013.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of July, 2013, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

MARK W. OLSON
\
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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